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GLOBALIZATION AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT
1

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
is at best an incomplete vision for increasing consumer protection
and heightening corporate responsibility. Despite calls from the
Obama Administration and the United States Department of the
* Associate Professor and Chair of the Project for Law and Business Ethics,
University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
The Ohio State University. I would like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her editorial
comments and encouragement while drafting this essay. I would also like to thank
the editorial board of the American University Law Review for inviting me to participate
at their symposium and to contribute to this symposium issue. The views set forth in
this essay are completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any
employer or client either past or present.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
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Treasury for a new foundation for financial regulation in the United
2
States, Congress’s response failed to satisfy these calls because the
foundation created by the Dodd-Frank Act is cracked, fragmented,
and incomplete. In many regards, the Dodd-Frank Act is simply an
invitation for regulation based on the myriad of studies that it
3
requires to be conducted for purposes of future regulatory action.
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf (explaining the agenda of the Obama Administration and the
United States Department of the Treasury for financial regulatory reform and calling
for “a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and
more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards
innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial
market”).
3. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 123, 124 Stat. at 1412 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5333) (requiring a study of the effects of size and complexity of financial
institutions on capital market efficiency and economic growth); id. § 202(f), at 1449
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382) (requiring a study of international coordination
relating to the bankruptcy process for financial companies); id. § 215, at 1518–19 (to
be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a study of secured creditor haircuts); id.
§ 216, at 1519 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a study of the
bankruptcy process for financial and nonbank financial institutions); id. § 217, at
1519–20 (requiring a study of international coordination relating to the bankruptcy
process for nonbank financial institutions); id. § 415, at 1578 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-18c) (requiring a study of the criteria for accredited investor status and
eligibility to invest in private funds); id. § 416, at 1579 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-18c) (requiring a study of a self-regulatory organization for private funds); id.
§ 417 (requiring a study of short selling); id. § 526, at 1591 (to be codified to
15 U.S.C. § 8205) (requiring a study of the nonadmitted insurance market); id.
§ 603(b)(1), at 1598–99 (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 1815) (requiring a study of the
treatment of credit card banks, industrial loan companies, and certain other
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956); id. § 620, at 1631 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (requiring a study of bank investment activities); id.
§ 750, at 1748–49 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25) (requiring a study on oversight of
the carbon markets); id. § 913, at 1824–30 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o)
(requiring a study regarding the obligations of brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers); id. § 914, at 1830 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study
on enhancing investment adviser examinations); id. § 917, at 1836 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study regarding financial literacy among investors);
id. § 918, at 1837 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study regarding
mutual fund advertising); id. § 919A, at 1837–38 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b11) (requiring a study of conflicts of interest within the investment industry); id.
§ 919B, at 1838–39 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10) (requiring a study on
improved investor access to information regarding investment advisers and brokerdealers); id. § 919C, at 1839–40 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10) (requiring a study
on financial planners and the use of financial designations); id. § 929Y, at 1871 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (requiring a study on the extraterritorial
application of private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); id.
§ 929Z (requiring a study on securities litigation); id. § 939C, at 1888 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (requiring a study on strengthening credit rating agency
independence); id. § 939D, at 1888 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring a
study on alternative business models for compensating statistical rating
organizations); id. § 939E, at 1888–89 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring
a study regarding creating an independent professional organization for rating
analysts employed by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations); id.
§ 939F, at 1889–90 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring a study of
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Worse yet, the Dodd-Frank Act fails to confront the realities of the
emerging global financial markets by focusing almost exclusively on
domestic issues, while failing to address new international realities.
Financial markets are now global, which has created new risks for
consumers and new loopholes for avoiding corporate responsibility.
Globalization has occurred for a variety of reasons. These reasons
include the development of new strong national economies around
the world in countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, i.e. the
4
“BRIC” nations, and a new excitement for transnational financial
opportunities, as demonstrated by the continued development of the
5
European Union.
Perhaps, the single biggest factor in the
globalization of financial markets has been the creation and

assigned credit ratings); id. § 946, at 1898 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7)
(requiring a study of the macroeconomic effects of risk retention requirements
relating to asset-backed securities); id. § 967, at 1913–14 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d-4) (requiring a study relating to organization reform within the SEC); id. § 968,
at 1914 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-4) (requiring a study relating to the
“revolving door” between the SEC and private sector financial institutions); id. § 976,
at 1923–24 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (requiring a study regarding increased
disclosure to investors by issuers of municipal securities); id. § 977, at 1924 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (requiring a study of the municipal securities markets);
id. § 989, at 1939–41 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o) (requiring a study of
proprietary trading by various financial institutions); id. § 989F, at 1947–48 (to be
codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 11) (requiring a study of person-to-person lending); id.
§ 989I, at 1948–49 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 5) (requiring a study regarding
the exemption for smaller issuers from section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002); id. § 1074, at 2067–68 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1) (requiring a
study on ending the conservatorship of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and reforming the
housing finance system); id. § 1076, at 2075 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602)
(requiring a study on reverse mortgage transactions); id. § 1078, at 2076 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602) (requiring a study on credit scores); id. § 1406, at 2142
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601) (requiring a study of shared appreciation
mortgages); id. § 1446, at 2172 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701) (requiring a study
on default and foreclosure of home loans); id. § 1476, at 2200–02 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 2603) (requiring a study on the effectiveness and impact of various
appraisal methods, valuation models and distributions channels, and on the Home
Valuation Code of conduct and the Appraisal Subcommittee); id. § 1492, at 2206 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5219b) (requiring a study on government efforts to combat
mortgage foreclosure rescue scams and loan modification fraud); id. § 1494, at 2207
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-25) (requiring a study on the effect of the
presence of drywall imported from China during the period beginning with 2004
and ending at the end of 2007 on foreclosures); id. § 1506, at 2222 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78m-2) (requiring a study of core deposits and brokered deposits).
4. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
1581, 1590 (2010) (discussing how the rise of the “BRIC” nations has decreased the
importance of the United States’ economy in the global market).
5. Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers: How
the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s
Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 116 (2006) (“The Common
Market project that has created today’s European Union has produced a unified, lawmaking jurisdiction comparable in scale and influence to the United States.”).
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development of the Internet, which has allowed financial markets to
6
become interconnected in a manner that was not previously possible.
Although the globalization of financial markets creates many new
opportunities, such globalization also generates systemic risks that
did not exist before. Financial institutions and other businesses
seeking lower levels of regulation can now move from nation to
nation seeking weaker regulatory standards, producing a race-to-the7
bottom in international financial regulation.
Moreover, the
interconnectedness of these markets means that financial crises that
might have been national or regional events in the past are much
8
more likely to become global.
Although a seamless web of
regulation for these emerging global markets is likely infeasible,
increased international coordination and cooperation is needed.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank
9
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law. As stated
in the preamble, Congress promulgated the Act “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
10
purposes.” In short, Congress drafted the Dodd-Frank Act to be an
11
overhaul of the regulation of the United States financial system.
Congress promulgated the Dodd-Frank Act partially in response to
the United States Department of the Treasury’s June 2009 white
paper report on the financial crisis that began in 2008, Financial
12
Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation.
In the report, the Obama
6. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global
Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 86 (2007) (discussing how the rise of the Internet
has given investors unlimited access to global capital markets).
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 8 (“As we have witnessed
during this crisis, financial stress can spread easily and quickly across national
boundaries. Yet, regulation is still set largely in a national context. Without
consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and
intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial system.”).
8. See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 105, 112 (2007) (“An interesting challenge in the regulation of foreign
investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when things go
wrong overseas, like the Parmalat scandal on the Asian financial crisis of 1997.”);
Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 33 (1999) (“Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have
become international, just like trading markets.”).
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2.
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Administration, through the Department of the Treasury, laid out its
five key objectives for financial regulatory reform:
•Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms
•Establish comprehensive regulation of financial markets
•Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse
•Provide the government with the tools it needs to manage
financial crises
•Raise international regulatory standards and improve
13
international cooperation

All of these objectives are reflected to some degree within the
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Congress’s efforts to raise international regulatory standards and
improve international cooperation, however, were limited at best.
Congress did not completely ignore the Obama Administration’s and
the Department of the Treasury’s calls for reform. The Department
of the Treasury’s June 2009 white paper report contained a long list
of regulatory objectives to raise international regulatory standards
and improve international cooperation, including goals to:
•Strengthen the International Capital Framework
•Improve the Oversight of Global Financial Markets
•Enhance Supervision of Internationally Active Financial Firms
•Reform Crisis Prevention and Management Authorities and
Procedures
•Strengthen the Financial Stability Board
•Strengthen Prudential Regulations
•Expand the Scope of Regulation
•Introduce Better Compensation Practices
•Promote Stronger Standards in the Prudential Regulation, Money
Laundering/Terrorist Financing, and Tax Information
Exchange Areas
•Improve Accounting Standards
14
•Tighten Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies

Many of these goals were addressed at least in part by the Dodd-Frank
Act. With that said, the Dodd-Frank Act falls far short of providing
comprehensive reform relating to international regulatory standards

13. Id. at 2–4 (stating the United States Department of the Treasury’s five key
objectives for financial regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis that
began in 2008).
14. Id. at 80–88 (stating the United States Department of the Treasury’s
objectives for raising international regulatory standards and improving international
cooperation).
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and improving international cooperation among national financial
regulators.
This Article suggests that the Dodd-Frank Act represents an
incomplete vision for financial regulation because of its failure to
adequately address the globalization of financial markets. In fairness
to Congress, much of the coordination and cooperation that is
necessary on the international level will have to be fueled by the
executive branch and the administrative agencies charged with
regulatory oversight. With that said, however, the Dodd-Frank Act is
largely a twentieth century approach to regulating twenty-first century
financial markets because it fails to adequately address the
globalization of financial markets that has occurred within the past
few decades.
My previous scholarship on financial regulatory reform has focused
mainly on the need for harmonization and centralization of
international securities regulation. In other articles, I have discussed
the opportunity that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents
15
for reforming international securities law,
the need for
harmonization and centralization of international securities
16
regulation, the need for an evolutionary approach to reforming
17
international securities law, the United States government’s role in
the harmonization and centralization of international securities
18
regulation, and the need for a centralized global securities
19
regulator.
This Article supplements and extends my previous scholarship in
three main ways. First, this Article highlights the failure of the DoddFrank Act to adequately address the new realities of the emerging
global financial markets. Second, this Article discusses three specific
failures and calls attention to the incomplete vision of the DoddFrank Act in terms of the regulation of person-to-person lending, the
extraterritorial application of United States securities law, and
coordination amongst national financial regulators. Third, this

15. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International
Securities Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010).
16. See Eric C. Chaffee, supra note 4.
17. See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV.
587 (2011).
18. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187
(2010).
19. See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities
Regulation: A Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission
(forthcoming).
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Article advocates for increased cooperation and coordination among
financial regulators in all areas of financial regulation as a means of
preventing or lessening any future financial crisis.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II
discusses the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulation of the Internet
because of the central role that the Internet has played in the
globalization of financial markets. Part III examines the Dodd-Frank
Act and the extraterritorial application of United States financial
regulation, and Part IV discusses the Dodd-Frank Act and the
international coordination of financial regulation. Finally, in Part V,
this Article concludes that the Dodd-Frank Act is a good beginning
for regulatory reform but does not embody a comprehensive vision
for regulating the emerging global financial markets. Congress must
act quickly to fill in the missing pieces of financial regulatory reform
before another crisis ensues.
II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
The ubiquity of the Internet in financial transactions and in the
globalization of financial markets is beyond peradventure. The
Dodd-Frank Act, however, does little to address this reality. Within
the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Internet is
mentioned only a few dozen times. The two obvious responses to this
criticism are (1) that existing regulation allows for the proper
regulation of the Internet and (2) that many of the provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act implicitly extend to online financial activities. The
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
example, has demonstrated little concern about broadening its reach
to cover securities transactions occurring online, even in the absence
20
of an edict from Congress to do so.
Coupled with existing regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act, however,
does not embody a comprehensive vision for regulating financial
activity on the Internet. Congress concedes the limitations of the Act
in section 989F in which it commissions the Comptroller General of
the United States and the United States Government Accountability
Office to conduct a study regarding person-to-person lending to

20. See, e.g., Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to
Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services
Offshore, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7516, 63 Fed. Reg. 14806 (Mar. 27, 1998)
(vowing to take action “whenever [the SEC] believe[s] that fraudulent or
manipulative Internet activities have originated in the United States or placed U.S.
investors at risk”).
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determine what sort of regulatory structure should be imposed upon
21
it.
Person-to-person lending, which is also referred to as “person-toperson investing,” “peer-to-peer lending,” “peer-to-peer investing,”
and “lending 2.0,” refers to any online system of matching individual
22
lenders with individual borrowers. Person-to-person lending shares
characteristics with Internet auction sites such as eBay in the sense
that the purpose of person-to-person lending is to connect
23
individuals to facilitate financial transactions.
Person-to-person
lending also shares characteristics with Internet dating sites such as
match.com in the sense that both are designed to bring individuals
24
together for the purpose of creating a relationship.
Person-toperson lending is a small, but growing, segment of the lending
25
industry.
In section 989F, Congress expressly mandates, “[t]he Comptroller
General of the United States shall conduct a study of person to
person lending to determine the optimal Federal regulatory
26
structure.”
Section 989F requires the Comptroller General to
consult a wide variety of parties in formulating its response to personto-person lending, including “Federal banking agencies, the [United
States Securities and Exchange] Commission, consumer groups,
27
outside experts, and the person to person lending industry.” In
regard to the content of the study, the Act states the following:
The study required . . . shall include an examination of—
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 11)
(requiring that the Comptroller General of the United States and the United States
Government Accountability Office “determine the optimal Federal regulatory
structure” for person-to-person lending).
22. See Ron Lieber, The Gamble of Lending Peer to Peer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011,
at B1 (explaining that person-to-person lending connects individual lenders with
individual borrowers via the Internet).
23. See Who We Are, EBAY INC., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Apr. 3,
2011) (describing the online marketplace site as a way to connect individual buyers
and sellers).
24. See About Match.com Dating, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/
help/aboutus.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (outlining the process of matching
single individuals through online profiles with photos and member information).
25. See Alex Brill, Peer-to-Peer Lending:
Innovative Access to Credit and the
Consequences of Dodd-Frank, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (Dec. 3, 2010), at 1,
available
at
http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication_detail.asp?id=2215
(reporting that the financial crisis and resulting credit crunch, along with a record
number of bank failures, have boosted the budding peer-to-peer lending industry, a
“rapidly expanding financial services product . . . that competes directly with
traditional bank lines of credit and credit cards”).
26. Dodd-Frank Act § 989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1947 (2010) (to be codified at
5 U.S.C. app. 11).
27. Id. § 989F(a)(2).
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(A) the regulatory structure as it exists on the date of
enactment of this Act, as determined by the [United States
Securities and Exchange] Commission, with particular
attention to—
(i) the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to person to
person lending platforms;
(ii) the posting of consumer loan information on the
EDGAR database of the Commission; and
(iii) the treatment of privately held person to person
lending platforms as public companies;
(B) the State and other Federal regulators responsible for the
oversight and regulation of person to person lending markets;
(C) any Federal, State, or local government or private studies of
person to person lending completed or in progress on the date
of enactment of this Act;
(D) consumer privacy and data protections, minimum credit
standards, anti-money laundering and risk management in the
regulatory structure as it exists on the date of enactment of this
Act, and whether additional or alternative safeguards are
needed; and
28
(E) the uses of person to person lending.

In addition to determining the “optimal Federal regulatory structure”
29
for regulating person-to-person lending, the goal of the Comptroller
General’s and the Government Accountability Office’s study is to
generate a report containing “alternative regulatory options . . .
[and] recommendations on whether the alternative approaches
30
[would be] effective.” Section 989F mandates that the report must
be submitted no later than one year after the enactment date of the
31
Dodd-Frank Act.
Improving the regulatory structure for person-to-person lending is
necessary because, despite the benefits of person-to-person lending, it
also poses substantial risks. As a result of the ubiquity of the Internet,
the sources of these risks can be both domestic and abroad.
The benefits of person-to-person lending are substantial. This type
of lending makes more credit available, which helps to generate
32
economic growth. Moreover, this type of lending provides credit to
28. Id. § 989F(a)(3).
29. Id. § 989F(a)(1).
30. Id. § 989F(b)(2).
31. Id. § 989F(b)(1).
32. See Brad Stone, Lending Alternative Hits Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at B1
(reporting that peer-to-peer lending originated as an alternative source of funding at
a time when more traditional lending sources were shunning dependable borrowers
and increasing interest rates).
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populations who are traditionally underserved by the consumer
33
This allows capital to flow into economically
credit industry.
depressed communities, providing new opportunities for community
34
development and economic growth.
At the same time, the risks of person-to-person lending are also
substantial. The underserved populations to which person-to-person
lending provides credit are traditionally comprised of individuals who
35
are poor credit risks.
Person-to-person lending continues to be
36
marred by high borrower default rates and large lender losses. This
reality generates concerns that lenders are making inaccurate risk
assessments about their exposure to loss created by person-to-person
37
lending.
Additionally, high borrower default rates also generate
concerns about effective punishment of delinquent loans and
38
overzealous actions by lenders against borrowers in default.
Moreover, person-to-person lending has taken all of the concerns of
traditional lending and moved them from the “brick and mortar”
39
world of traditional lending regulation into cyberspace.
These
concerns include investment fraud, identity theft, consumer privacy
and data protection, securities fraud, money laundering, and
40
terrorism financing.

33. See generally Aleksandra Todorova, Peer-to-Peer Lending Offers Solution for
Strapped Consumers, SMART MONEY, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/
spending/deals/peer-to-peer-lending-offers-solution-for-strapped-consumers-21978/
(explaining that the recent economic crisis has forced homeowners, small business
owners, and credit card users to seek financing from non-traditional lending sources,
including person-to-person lending).
34. See id. (reporting that positive stories have emerged from the rise of personto-person lending, in which individuals who once were mired in payday loans have
been able to pay off their debt and raise their credit scores).
35. See Alan B. Krueger, In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for Cash, N.Y.
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:17 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-credit-crisis-some-turn-toonline-peers-for-cash/?scp=7&sq=peer-to-peer+lending&st=nyt (noting that personto-person lending sites tend to attract high-risk borrowers who cannot obtain credit
from more traditional lending sources, such as banks).
36. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 22, at B1 (noting that more than one-third of
loans on the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com were in default and the average
investor lost 4.95 percent annually).
37. See generally Brill, supra note 25 (explaining that rapid growth in peer-to-peer
lending has given rise to concerns about its regulation, spurring the Securities and
Exchange Commission and Congress to exercise oversight).
38. Id.
39. See Ian J. Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community
Development Finance 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper 2009-06, 2009),
available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2009/wp200906.pdf (providing a survey of diverse models for peer-to-peer lending in the United
States and explaining specific risks).
40. See id. at 11 (explaining various concerns created by person-to-person
lending).
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Remarkably, despite the myriad of risks generated by person-toperson lending, regulation of it has largely fallen on the SEC. The
SEC has taken an interest in person-to-person lending because of the
involvement of securities in one of the common models for such
41
lending. Under this model, a bank serves as an intermediary in a
person-to-person lending transaction by issuing a loan to an
42
individual borrower.
The loan is then sold as a note to the
individual lender with a return that is dependent on repayment of
43
the loan by the individual borrower. The note qualifies as a security
44
under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section
45
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provide the
definition of a security for purposes of federal securities law.
Specifically, under these definitional sections, the note in the personto-person lending transaction qualifies as a security because it is both
an investment contract under the test developed by the Supreme

41. See generally Carl E. Smith, If It’s Not Broken, Don’t Fix It: The SEC’s Regulation of
Peer-to-Peer Lending, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 21 (Fall/Winter 2009–2010) (discussing the SEC’s
regulation of person-to-person lending in the United States).
42. See id. at 21–22 (explaining the person-to-person lending models of Prosper
Marketplace, Inc. and LendingClub Corporation, two major person-to-person
lending platforms that have operated in the United States).
43. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock,
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating
to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
‘security’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.”).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2011) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock,
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a ‘security’; or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.”).
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Court of the United States in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. and a note
under the “family resemblance” test developed by the Supreme Court
47
of the United States in Reves v. Ernst & Young. Because the notes
issued in this model of person-to-person lending constitute securities,
they are subject to the registration, antifraud, and other provisions of
the federal securities laws.
As a result, the SEC has taken a relatively active role in regulating
person-to-person lending. On November 24, 2008, the SEC issued a
cease-and-desist order against Prosper Marketplace, Inc., the
Delaware corporation based in San Francisco that owns and operates
48
the person-to-person lending website www.prosper.com. The SEC
asserted that Prosper had violated sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the
Securities Act of 1933, which prohibit the sale of unregistered
securities, by selling notes to individual lenders that were generated
49
from loans by banks to individual borrowers. In response to the
SEC’s order, Prosper Marketplace, Inc. now must register the notes
50
that it sells as part of its person-to-person lending activities.
Relying on the SEC alone, however, to regulate person-to-person
lending will not create a sufficient level of regulation. This type of
lending implicates a plethora of areas of the law, including lending
regulation, securities regulation, consumer privacy and data
protection, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism controls, and
fraud prevention. Many of these areas of law are beyond the scope of
the SEC’s expertise and regulatory authority. Achieving a proper
level of regulation of person-to-person lending is as complex as, if not
more complex than, achieving a proper level of regulation of
traditional lending.
Congress needs to develop a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
person-to-person lending. This type of lending creates significant
risks for lenders, borrowers, and society unless it is adequately
regulated. The study and report mandated by section 989F of the
Dodd-Frank Act is a step in the right direction. Section 989F,
however, also reveals that the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody a
fully formed vision of regulation for financial activities occurring on
46. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (holding that the test for an investment contract,
which is a specific type of security for purposes of federal securities law, is “whether
the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others”).
47. 494 U.S. 56, 65–67 (1990) (providing the test for a note, which is a specific
type of security for purposes of a federal securities law).
48. Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 4978684
(Nov. 24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order).
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 6.

CHAFFEE.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

DODD-FRANK ACT: A FAILED VISION

5/17/2011 7:03 PM

1443

the Internet. This incomplete vision creates risks from threats
domestic and abroad to the United States financial system.
Congress should work quickly to create a comprehensive system of
regulation for person-to-person lending and to ensure that the
United States system of financial regulation adequately addresses the
risks created by the Internet. In regulating person-to-person lending,
Congress should take an approach similar to regulating traditional
lending including adopting policies that promote full and fair
disclosure and regulations that protect lenders and borrowers.
Moreover, Congress must address the special concerns created by
using the Internet to facilitate person-to-person lending, e.g., the
heightened risk of fraud, the dangers of identity theft, and the
possibility that such lending will be used for terrorism financing.
Because of the ubiquity of the Internet, Congress must work quickly
to stave off threats both domestic and abroad.
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REGULATION
The United States has traditionally maintained a high quality
system of financial regulation. The globalization of financial markets,
however, has fueled a ratcheting down of the level of regulation and
enforcement in the United States in an attempt to maintain the
competiveness of its national financial markets. The United States
Department of the Treasury in its June 2009 white paper report
stated the following in regard to the phenomenon:
As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread
easily and quickly across national boundaries. Yet, regulation is still
set largely in a national context. Without consistent supervision
and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to
the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global
51
financial system.

Put simply, unless steps are taken to end the race-to-the-bottom that is
occurring in financial regulation, additional and more intense
financial crises will occur.
The extraterritorial application of United States financial
regulation offers one means of combating the race-to-the-bottom that
is occurring because of the globalization of financial markets. The
race-to-the-bottom is the result of regulators competing to make their
particular jurisdiction appear more attractive to financial institutions
51. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 8.
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by lowering the level of financial regulation. If United States
financial regulation is applied extraterritorially, this helps to set a
floor of regulation in foreign jurisdictions because foreign regulators
may be able to ratchet down their own systems of financial regulation,
but they cannot ratchet down the system of the United States. This is
not to claim that the United States can and should reach every
financial transaction and financial matter around the globe.
However, broad extraterritorial application of United States
regulation can help to serve as a check against a race-to-the-bottom.
Remarkably, Congress opted to address the extraterritorial
application of federal financial regulation in only two provisions of
52
the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Act. Two possible reasons
for this may be (1) that existing regulation already allows for
extensive extraterritorial application of United States financial
regulation and (2) that many of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
may implicitly extend the extraterritorial reach of United States
financial regulation. Considering the Obama Administration’s and
the United States Department of the Treasury’s calls for
53
comprehensive international financial regulatory reform, however,
this limited emphasis on the extraterritorial application of United
States financial regulation is surprising to say the least.
The two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that do deal with the
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation
demonstrate that the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody a
comprehensive vision for financial regulatory reform.
These
provisions focus only on the extraterritorial application of federal
securities regulation and provide an incomplete vision for that area
of financial regulation because one of the provisions is a mandate for
54
additional study.
52. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47)
(2010) (strengthening the enforcement powers of the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission by clarifying the extraterritorial reach of their jurisdiction);
id. § 929Y, at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (mandating a study on the
extraterritorial application of private rights of action under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).
53. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2 (“We must build a new
foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and more
effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation
and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.”).
54. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P, 124 Stat. at 1862–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-47) (clarifying the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission to enforce the federal securities laws); id. § 929Y, at 1871
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (mandating a study regarding the
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
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Section 929P does strengthen and clarify the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to extraterritorially
enforce the United States securities laws. Specifically, section
55
929P(b)(1) modifies section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 by
adding the following new subsection:
(c) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts of
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of section 17(a) involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
56
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.

Similarly, section 929P(b)(2) modifies section 27 of the Securities
57
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding the following new subsection:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts
of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of the antifraud provisions of this title involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
58
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.

Finally, section 929P(b)(3) modifies section 214 of the Investment
59
Advisers Act of 1940 by adding the following new subsection:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts
of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of section 206 involving—

55. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
56. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(1), 124. Stat. at 1864 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a)) (modifying § 22 of the Securities Act of 1933).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).
58. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1865 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa) (modifying § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2000).
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the violation is
committed by a foreign adviser and involves only foreign
investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
60
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.

Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act is a positive step in addressing
the new systemic risk created by the globalization of financial markets
because it strengthens the SEC’s role in regulating those markets.
However, it stands as the lone provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that
clarifies the extraterritorial application of the United States system of
financial regulation.
Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC solicit
public comment and conduct a study regarding extending the
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the
61
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, Congress charged the
SEC with studying whether private rights of action should be
extended to “conduct within the United States that constitutes a
significant step in the furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves
only foreign investors” and “conduct occurring outside the United
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
62
States.”
In conducting its study, the SEC was charged with
considering the following:
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more
limited to extend just to institutional investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on
international comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of
action for transnational securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be
63
adopted.

The report based on the study is due no later than eighteen months
64
after the enactment of the statute.
Congress’s approach to the extraterritorial application of federal
securities law is, in a certain regard, laudable. The provisions of the
60. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1865 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80(b)-14) (modifying § 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
61. Id. § 929Y(a), at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 929Y(b).
64. Id. § 929Y(c).
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Dodd-Frank Act demonstrate Congress taking a cautious approach to
reforming the extraterritorial application of federal securities law.
Such an approach is warranted because of shifting judicial
interpretations of the provisions governing the extraterritorial
application of federal securities law at the time of the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Morrison v.
65
National Australia Bank Ltd. on June 24, 2010, roughly a month prior
66
to President Barack Obama signing the Dodd-Frank Act into law. In
Morrison, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the
extraterritorial application of federal securities regulation and held
that a general presumption exists against the extraterritorial
67
application of federal securities law. In that case, during February
1998, National Australia Bank Limited (National), an Australian Bank
whose “ordinary shares” were not traded on any exchange in the
United States, acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a
68
mortgage servicing company headquartered in Florida.
From
February 1998 until mid-2001, National’s annual reports, public
documents, and other public statements asserted that HomeSide was
69
operating successfully.
However, on July 5, 2001, National
announced that it was writing down HomeSide’s assets by $450
million and on September 3, 2001, National announced that it was
70
writing down HomeSide’s assets by an additional $1.75 billion.
Russell Leslie Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock (the
Plaintiffs), all of whom are Australian, sought to represent a class of
foreign purchasers of National’s ordinary shares that were sold
outside of the United States in an action brought in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York against National,
71
HomeSide, and the officers of both companies (the Defendants).
The Plaintiffs alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
72
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. The Southern
District of New York granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss based
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction because the acts in the United States were
65. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2879 (rearticulating the principle that cases arising under federal law,
including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, carry a
presumption against extraterritoriality).
68. Id. at 2875 (recounting the underlying facts of the case).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2875–76.
71. Id. at 2876.
72. Id.
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arguably only steps in a fraud that occurred abroad. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on similar
74
grounds.
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinions of both the lower
courts. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the Court’s
analysis by stating that the issue should be decided as a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, rather than a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1),
because the issue in the case was whether the Plaintiffs could state a
75
claim under which relief could be granted. The Court went on to
hold that a presumption exists against extraterritorial application of
the federal securities laws, unless a “clear indication” of such
76
application is stated in the particular statute. The Court rebuked
the Second Circuit and courts in other circuits for their case law
77
departing from his presumption. Justice Scalia wrote, “Rather than
guess anew in each case we apply the presumption in all cases,
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate
78
with predictable effects.” The Court also clarified that “the focus of
the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United
79
States.”
The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act show Congress struggling
with the Court’s holding in Morrision and responding to the Court’s
call for Congress to legislate. In section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress clarifies the scope of the SEC’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
80
by adopting a conduct and effects approach, and in section 929Y,
Congress demonstrates a willingness to consider extending
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by mandating a study of the issue by
81
the SEC. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act reflects Congress’s willingness
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2876–77.
76. Id. at 2878.
77. Id. at 2878–80.
78. Id. at 2881.
78. Id. at 2884.
80. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864–65 (to be codified at
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“strengthening and clarifying the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to extraterritorially enforce the United
States securities laws”).
81. Id. § 929Y(a), at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d) (requiring that the
SEC solicit public comment and conduct a study regarding extending the
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
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to allow broader extraterritorial application of United States
securities regulation in the face of the Court’s holding limiting such
extraterritorial application.
Congress’s failure to focus on the extraterritorial application of
other sorts of financial regulation, however, is remarkable. At
minimum, Congress should have required a study of the
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation in
general, rather than just requiring a discrete study on extraterritorial
application of the private rights of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. With the globalization of financial markets,
Congress should have taken a more aggressive approach to the
extraterritorial application of financial regulation as a means of
policing those financial markets and reducing system risk.
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION
The internationalization of financial markets creates the need for
greater coordination and cooperation among financial regulators.
The Obama Administration, through the United States Department
of the Treasury’s June 2009 white paper report, acknowledged the
need for greater coordination and cooperation by making one of its
five key objectives for financial regulatory reform the raising of
international regulatory standards and improvement of international
82
cooperation. Congress’s response in the Dodd-Frank Act does show
some promise, but it remains weaker than necessary to properly
regulate the emerging global financial markets.
Section 175 of the Dodd-Frank Act governs international policy
coordination. Specifically, section 175(a) of the Act allows the
President or the President’s designees to “coordinate through all
available international policy channels, similar policies as those found
in United States law relating to limiting the scope, nature, size, scale,
concentration, and interconnectedness of financial companies, in
83
order to protect financial stability and the global economy.” Section
175(b) of the Act requires the Chairperson of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to “regularly consult with the financial regulatory
entities and other appropriate organizations of foreign governments
82. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2–4 (listing “[r]aise
international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation” as the
Obama Administration’s and United States Department of the Treasury’s “five key
objectives” for financial regulatory reform).
83. Dodd-Frank Act § 175(a), 124 Stat. at 1442 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5373).
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or international organizations on matters relating to systemic risk to
84
the international financial system.” Finally, section 175(c) requires
that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Secretary of the Treasury “consult with their foreign counterparts and
through appropriate multilateral organizations to encourage
comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation for
85
all highly leveraged and interconnected financial companies.”
Although the mandates of section 175 are vague, Congress’s
acknowledgement of the need for international coordination is
admirable.
Moreover, section 112(a)(2)(D) of the Act expressly charges the
Financial Stability Oversight Council with a duty “to monitor
domestic and international financial regulatory proposals and
developments, including insurance and accounting issues, and to
advise Congress and make recommendations in such areas that will
enhance the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the
86
U.S. financial markets.” Assuming that this mandate is met, the
Financial Stability Oversight Council should prove a valuable
resource for monitoring international regulatory proposals and
developments, which may potentially lead to greater coordination
among United States financial regulators and foreign financial
regulators.
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, fails to embody a fully formed vision
of international coordination of financial regulation as demonstrated
by the studies it requires for purposes of future regulation. Notably,
section 202(f) of the Act requires that “[t]he Comptroller General of
the United States shall conduct a study regarding international
coordination relating to the orderly liquidation of financial
87
companies under the Bankruptcy Code.”
In regard to the
bankruptcy process, the Comptroller General is specifically charged
with evaluating the following:
(i) the extent to which international coordination currently exists;
(ii) current mechanisms and structures for facilitating
international cooperation;
(iii) barriers to effective international coordination; and
(iv) ways to increase and make more effective international
88
coordination.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § 175(b).
Id. § 175(c).
Id. § 112(a)(2)(D), at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322).
Id. § 202(f), at 1449 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382).
Id. § 202(f)(1)(B).
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The report based on the study is due no later than one year after the
89
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 217 of the Act requires
that a substantially similar study be conducted for nonbank financial
institutions by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
90
System.
Congress’s lack of a coherent vision for the bankruptcy of
transnational financial institutions, which is evidenced by the studies
required in section 202(f) and section 217 of the Act, is disturbing for
two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the Dodd-Frank Act does not
embody a comprehensive vision for regulating the emerging global
financial markets. Second, it evidences that Congress has likely failed
to meet one of its stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act, i.e., to put
an end to financial institutions that are “too big to fail,” because these
institutions are likely to exist transnationally, and the Act does not
embody an orderly plan for transnational reorganization or
dissolution.
In addition to Congress’s lack of a coherent vision for the
bankruptcy of transnational financial institutions, Congress’s efforts
in the Dodd-Frank Act are inadequate to ensure a proper level of
regulation of the emerging global capital markets. The Dodd-Frank
Act contains a few provisions requiring coordination among
regulators regarding securities-related issues. For example, section
752 requires the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the prudential regulators
to
consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the
establishment of consistent international standards with respect to
the regulation (including fees) of swaps, security-based swaps, swap
entities, and security-based swap entities and may agree to such
information-sharing arrangements as may be deemed to be
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, swap counterparties, and security-based swap
91
counterparties.

The Dodd-Frank Act, however, by no means contains a
comprehensive vision for regulating the emerging global capital
markets.
A new vision is needed for international cooperation and
coordination among securities regulators because, within the past few
89. Id. § 202(f)(2).
90. See id. § 217, at 1519–20 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a
study of international coordination regarding the bankruptcy process for nonbank
financial institutions).
91. Id. § 752(a), at 1749–50 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8325).
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decades, capital markets have transformed from being national or
92
regional in nature to being global. Many of the reasons for the
globalization of capital markets are the same or similar to the reasons
for the globalization of financial markets in general, e.g., the
development of new strong economies around the world in countries
such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and a new excitement for
transnational financial opportunities, as demonstrated by the
93
continued development of the European Union.
Moreover, the
Internet and other forms of communication have helped sew
together the world’s capital markets in a way that has not previously
94
been possible.
The globalization of capital markets also has occurred for a variety
of other reasons. Issuers now look beyond the borders of their home
95
countries for opportunities to raise capital, and many retail and
institutional investors search for investment opportunities worldwide
as a means of portfolio diversification and to offset currency
92. See Greene, supra note 6, at 85 (contending that there is “no argument that
the securities markets are now global” and that the SEC must take action because
other securities markets and regulators are as sophisticated as the United States and
“the dominance of the United States as the leading player in the global marketplace
is being challenged”).
93. See DeLaMater, supra note 5, at 117 (noting that not only have non-U.S.
securities markets “grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty
years and now afford issuers in their home countries significant opportunities for
financing that did not previously exist” but that European markets have become
viable alternatives to U.S. markets because they are more receptive to equity offerings
and longer-term debt offerings than they were in the past).
94. See Greene, supra note 6, at 86 (reporting that the Internet provides investors
with “almost limitless information,” which, along with increasingly sophisticated
investors and the need for financial diversification outside of the United States, has
fueled a growing desire to interact directly with non-U.S. market participants); Susan
Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on A Blueprint from Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–70 (2007)
(characterizing globalization as “a fact,” citing (1) technologies that are creating
more efficient trading across the globe, (2) capital market participants who are
expanding their activities into foreign markets, and (3) investors who are searching
for international investment opportunities); George W. Madison & Stewart P.
Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors:
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 99 (2007) (“The rapid pace
of technological advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global
capital market. In such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity,
greater diversification, and a wider range of investment options regardless of their
location.”); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 33 (2007) (stating
that technological advances have contributed to the possibility of having a “truly
global capital market” by reducing “structural barriers” to global trade in services and
goods).
95. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1692, 1711 (2008) (explaining that the SEC cannot assume that the U.S. markets will
continue to be the leading capital markets, as “U.S. investors are buying foreign
securities in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make
offerings in the U.S. to raise capital”).
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96

fluctuations.
Additionally, the transformation of many securities
exchanges into for-profit institutions as a result of demutualization
has caused those exchanges to eschew previous nationalistic and
protectionist tendencies in favor of searching for profit-making
97
opportunities globally.
Demutualization has created a wave of
98
exchange consolidation. On April 4, 2007, the merger between the
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext gave birth to the world’s
99
first global stock exchange, and the ensuing push for consolidation
100
continues to fuel globalization.
The globalization of capital markets creates new systemic risks. In
the absence of a harmonized and centralized system of monitoring,
regulation, and enforcement, concerns linger about a race-to-thebottom in international securities law as national and regional
regulators ratchet down their securities laws in an attempt to attract
96. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition,
3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 195 (2008) (detailing the world’s most recent wealth gains,
which have occurred in areas like the Middle East, Russia, India, and China, and
concluding that “[a]s global markets improve, U.S. investors, both institutional and
retail, have expanded their geographic reach so as to be almost as willing and able to
trade in those markets as in New York”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 94, at 31
(“Investors now search beyond their own borders for investment opportunities and,
unlike the past, many of these investors are not large companies, financial firms, or
extremely wealthy individuals.”).
97. See Jenah, supra note 94, at 71 (reporting that the conversion of securities
exchanges into for-profit entities has “unleashed pressure from shareholders to
increase profits through expansion, investment in new technology, and cost cutting,
forcing these for-profit entities to eschew nationalistic or protectionist tendencies in
the bid for value maximization”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York
Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
355, 356 (2007) (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of exchanges is that
the exchanges have demutualized and become public companies. They need to
please their shareholders as well as their customers.”).
98. See Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets,
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 136 (2007) (reporting that Euronext joined
together exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris and that OMX joined
exchanges in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Iceland, Riga, Stockholm, Tallinn, and Vilnius).
99. See generally Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International
Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 152 (2007) (discussing
exchange demutualization, international regulatory standards (“or lack thereof”)
between the United States and the European Union, and “international regulatory
coordination as illustrated by the merger between NYSE and Euronext”); Sara M.
Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly Transnational Exchange?,
33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008) (examining the New York Stock Exchange and
Euronext merger in detail and calling for additional harmonization between the
United States and the European Union securities regulatory agencies).
100. See Jenah, supra note 94, at 71 (“This chess game of proposed exchange
mergers, capital tie-ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears
witness to the truism that capital markets are global.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note
94, at 31 (“Today, mergers and talks of mergers among the world’s stock exchanges
make obvious what financial professionals have long known: capital markets are
global. Greater investor wealth and education have created the demand for such
markets, and technology, in particular, has made globalized markets feasible.”).
See generally supra note 99 (detailing the merger between the NYSE and Euronext).
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issuers, investors, and other market participants to their
101
Moreover, the existing fragmented system of
jurisdictions.
regulation creates concerns about regulatory and enforcement gaps
and various collective action problems in determining which
102
regulators should address particular issues.
The vague mandates of sections 175 and 112 of the Dodd-Frank
Act offer little to no guidance as to the United States’ role in
regulating the emerging global capital markets. Ideally, regulators
from around the globe should join together to create a harmonized
and centralized system of securities law that would provide a seamless
103
web of monitoring, regulation, and enforcement.
However, this
104
At minimum,
type of cooperation is unrealistic in the short-term.
Congress should have provided some guidance as to the United
States’ role in regulating the emerging global capital markets. The
United States does participate in transnational organizations such as
the International Organization of Securities of Commissions
(IOSCO), which do provide some coordination among national and
105
regional securities regulators.
The United States, however, has
traditionally been a leader in the area of securities regulation, and

101. See also Langevoort, supra note 96, at 193 (arguing that the financial crisis that
began in 2008 demonstrates “that other countries have been too lax as well, so that
there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the United States,
but worldwide”).
102. See Karmel, supra note 8, at 39 (acknowledging that because many securities
violations are transnational, national laws need to be given extraterritorial effect;
however, if those laws are given extraterritorial effect, that would create “conflict
between regulators and confusion on the part of regulated persons as to what are the
proper rules”); Langevoort, supra note 96, at 204 (articulating the “classic free rider
problem” that “[w]hen trading is heavily fragmented, no nation is able to capture
enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation”); Tafara & Peterson,
supra note 94, at 32 (explaining that the current regulatory gaps in foreign markets
present risks to U.S. investors that do not exist in United States markets).
103. See supra notes 15–19 (arguing in favor of the creation of a harmonized and
centralized system of international securities regulation).
104. See Langevoort, supra note 96, at 205 (arguing that a global securities and
financial services regulator will not come into being any time soon, “[e]ven in the
face of crisis and scandal,” until countries take “small steps” toward coordinating
enforcement efforts and the idea of a permanent regulatory institution becomes less
politically threatening”). But see Karmel, supra note 8, at 40 (“Securities regulators
do not have a long history of mutual cooperation and the coordination of
investigative activities that bank regulators have long enjoyed. Nevertheless, many
securities regulators now have exchanged Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
and cooperate extensively with regard to their investigative activities.”).
105. See IOSCO Historical Background, OICV-IOSCO
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last visited Mar. 28,
2011) (“[IOSCO’s] membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities
markets and it is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market
regulatory agencies. IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100
jurisdictions and its membership continues to grow.”).
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Congress’s lack of vision in the Dodd-Frank Act regarding
international securities regulation is remarkable to say the least.
The Dodd-Frank Act fails to embody a fully formed vision of
international coordination of financial regulation, especially in
regard to international bankruptcy law and international securities
regulation. Congress may have touted the Dodd-Frank Act as
comprehensive regulatory reform, but it should really be viewed as
just a beginning. Congress must act quickly to provide greater
coordination and cooperation among the world’s financial regulators
in regard to international bankruptcy law and international securities
regulation. Moreover, Congress must implement a regulatory regime
that encourages coordination and cooperation among the world’s
financial regulators in general.
V. THE NEED FOR A NEW VISION FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM
Financial markets are now global, which has created new risks for
106
consumers and new loopholes for avoiding corporate responsibility.
As evidenced by the crisis that began in 2008, the globalization of
107
financial markets has yielded new systemic risks and weaknesses.
Despite the globalization of markets, financial regulation remains set
largely in the national context. The globalization of financial
markets has resulted in regulatory and enforcement gaps, collective
108
action problems, and market inefficiencies.
Despite calls by the Obama Administration and the United States
Department of the Treasury for a new foundation for financial
109
regulation, the foundation created by the Dodd-Frank Act is
cracked, fragmented, and incomplete. Congress has failed to deliver
a comprehensive vision for regulatory reform within the voluminous
body of the Dodd-Frank Act. This incomplete vision for financial
regulatory reform is evidenced by the myriad of studies required to
110
be conducted for purposes of future regulation and Congress’s

106. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (discussing the globalization of
financial markets).
107. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (analyzing the risks created by the
globalization of financial markets.
108. See supra notes 101–02 (discussing the issues created by the globalization of
capital markets).
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (detailing the Obama
Administration’s and the United States Department of the Treasury’s objectives for
raising international regulatory standards and improving international cooperation).
110. See supra note 3 (listing the numerous studies that Congress mandated under
the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
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lackluster efforts to raise international regulatory standards and
111
improve international cooperation.
As highlighted in this article, the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody
a comprehensive vision for international financial regulatory reform.
First, the Dodd-Frank Act contains little to address the role of the
Internet in financial transactions and in the globalization of financial
112
markets.
Congress’s lack of regulatory vision for person-to-person
lending is especially troubling because this type of lending remains
largely unregulated and presents all of the risks of traditional
113
lending. Second, the Dodd-Frank Act contains little to address the
114
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation.
Congress does clarify the jurisdiction of the SEC in enforcing federal
115
securities law.
However, Congress studies only the potential
exterritorial application of private rights of action under the
116
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it ignores the extraterritorial
application of United States financial regulation in a plethora of
other contexts. Third, the Dodd-Frank Act does not provide for
117
sufficient coordination of international financial regulation.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act supplies general mandates about
118
coordination among financial regulators, the lack of a fully formed
vision for international coordination and cooperation in regard to

111. See supra Parts II–IV (detailing the shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act in
regard to the regulation of the Internet, the extraterritorial application of United
States financial regulation, and international coordination of regulation).
112. See supra Part II (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and regulation of the
Internet).
113. See supra Part II (discussing the study of person-to-person lending mandated
by § 989F of the Dodd-Frank Act and the failure of Congress to provide any
additional guidance or indication as to how person-to-person lending should be
regulated).
114. See supra Part III (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and the extraterritorial
application of United States financial regulation).
115. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (detailing Congress’s
clarification in § 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act of the SEC’s power to extraterritorially
enforce the United States securities laws).
116. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (noting Congress’s mandate
under § 929Y that the SEC solicit public comment and conduct a study regarding
extending the extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the
Securities Act of 1934).
117. See supra Part IV (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and international
coordination of financial regulation).
118. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (discussing § 175, which
governs international policy coordination); supra note 86 and accompanying text
(noting that § 112(a)(2)(D) of the Dodd-Frank Act charges the Financial Stability
Oversight Council with a duty to monitor international financial proposal and
developments).
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119

international bankruptcy law and international securities regulation
120
is troubling to say the least.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act represents a good first step in
financial regulatory reform, Congress must acknowledge that it is
only a first step and work to address the numerous issues that are left
open by the Dodd-Frank Act. Congress’s focus should be to create a
comprehensive system of financial regulation that focuses on
coordination and cooperation in the international realm. In the
wake of the Great Depression in the 1930s, coordination and
cooperation on the national level ushered in an era of relative
financial stability in the United States that lasted for the remainder of
121
the twentieth century.
Because of the globalization of financial
markets that has occurred in the past few decades, coordination and
cooperation must become the norm on the international level in the
wake of the Great Recession that began in 2008. Congress must
supply a new vision for international financial regulatory reform to
supplant the incomplete vision embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.

119. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the
Dodd-Frank Act for failing to provide a fully formed vision of international
coordination relating to international bankruptcies).
120. See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the
Dodd-Frank Act to provide a proper level of regulation for the emerging global
capital markets).
121. See, Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of
the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009)
(discussing the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of securities regulation in the
United States in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression);
see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2006)
(noting that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “represent the
first major federal attempts at securities regulation”).

